Assessment of International Criminal Evidence:The Case of the Unpredictable Génocidaire by Behrens, Paul
ZaöRV 71 (2011), 661-689 
Assessment of International Criminal 
Evidence: The Case of the Unpredictable 
Génocidaire 
 
Paul Behrens* 
 
 
I. Introduction 662 
II. Inconsistent Behavior in Genocide Cases: The View of the International 
 Criminal Tribunals 671 
III. Towards an Understanding of Contradictory Evidence 676 
 1. Does Contradictory Evidence Exist? 676 
 2. Does Contradictory Evidence Exist at the Same Time? 681 
IV. Towards an Assessment of Contradictory Evidence 682 
V. Conclusion 687 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Given the importance of evidentiary considerations in international 
criminal trials, it is somewhat surprising that the Rules of Evidence of the 
international criminal tribunals do not provide for detailed norms on the 
assessment of evidence. The need for a clearer framework is particularly ap-
parent in cases in which judges have to deal with the complex issue of spe-
cific intent. The adjudication of genocide is the most prominent example: 
specific intent is acknowledged as the element that gives genocide its special 
character. But the Trial Chambers have struggled with its assessment – in 
particular in situations where the conduct of the suspected génocidaire has 
not been consistent. In the course of their work, the tribunals have given 
widely differing assessments to this phenomenon. 
It is suggested that an analytical examination of cases of inconsistent be-
havior can help in the development of rules for the evaluation of these situa-
tions. A preliminary question has to be whether contradictory strands of 
evidence do in fact exist: not every piece of evidence that points to reasons 
other than genocidal intent does thereby exclude the co-existence of specific 
intent. A further question has to attach to the value that specific strands of 
evidence have. Certain forms of evidence on which the Trial Chambers re-
lied – such as the existence of a plan – are subject to criticism: they may well 
indicate the existence of a crime other than genocide. In other situations, the 
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Trial Chambers find it difficult to evaluate a particular form of evidence 
(e.g., the lack of positive acts). 
This article accepts that the considerable variations in the findings of the 
Trial Chambers on inconsistent behavior are partly due to the very complex 
nature of genocidal intent. But it concludes that the absence of clear guide-
lines on the weighing of evidence must also be held accountable for the re-
sulting differences in approach. The current situation furthers the freedom 
of assessment; but it achieves this objective at the expense of legal certainty. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The evaluation of evidence has traditionally occupied a significant place 
in the deliberations of international courts and tribunals. The importance of 
this task was evident even in the first case to be decided by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ);1 and its prominent position has been retained in sub-
sequent case-law of the court.2 Before international criminal tribunals, the 
significance of evidentiary deliberations is even more apparent. Acceptance 
or dismissal of evidence and distinctions in the weighing of strands of evi-
dence have a direct impact on a finding on the liability of the defendant,3 
and the reasoning of the Trial Chambers on this matter is subject to review 
by the Appeals Chambers which offer further insights on the evaluation of 
                                                        
1  The Corfu Channel Case, in which the question arose whether mine-laying operations 
would have been observed by the lookout posts of the Albanian government. The Experts of 
the ICJ went so far as to conduct a visibility test on the evening of 28.1.1949, to which the 
Court made explicit reference: “A motor ship, 27 metres long, and with no bridge, wheel-
house, or funnel, and very low on the water, was used. The ship was completely blacked out, 
and on a moonless night, i.e., under the most favourable conditions for avoiding discovery, it 
was clearly seen and heard from St. George’s Monastery. The noise of the motor was heard at 
a distance of 1,800 metres, and the ship itself was sighted at 670 metres and remained visible 
up to about 1,900 metres.”, Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Reports 1949, 21. 
2  For instance, in the Elettronica Sicula Case, the court rejected the claim of discrimina-
tory reasons behind a requisition order because of lack of evidence, Case Concerning Elet-
tronica Sicula S. p. A. (ELSI), ICJ Reports 1989, 72 et seq., para. 122. In the Nicaragua Case, it 
considered the existing evidence insufficient for a finding of attributability of military or 
paramilitary acts; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nica-
ragua (Merits), ICJ Reports 1986, 112 et seq., para. 216. 
3  In a recent case, a defendant who was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by the ICTR 
Trial Chamber for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity was acquitted and 
released by the Appeals Chamber, after the latter had noted several errors in the Trial Cham-
ber’s assessment of the evidence; ICTR (Appeals Chamber), Case No. ICTR-01-73-A, Protais 
Zigiranyirazo v. The Prosecutor, Judgment 16.11.2009 (Zigiranyirazo, Appeals Chamber), 
para. 73. 
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evidence.4 In addition, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) all have specific Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence (the RPE)5 by which the chambers are bound. 
The need for a conclusive analysis of the evidentiary situation is particu-
larly strong in cases where a subjective perception lies at the heart of the 
matter. Objective conduct carries its own difficulties: eyewitnesses may be 
unreliable; documentary evidence may be open to interpretation. But the 
mind is a closed realm; absent any (credible) statement by the person con-
cerned, the court will find it difficult to assess the thought processes of the 
individual. The matter is further complicated if the evaluation of evidence 
involves the examination of a heightened form of the subjective element, 
which no longer finds a counterpart in an objective act. That is the case 
when international tribunals are called upon to evaluate claims which in-
volve a determination of specific intent: an intent which goes beyond the 
mere mirror image of the act in question. Finding a witness, who saw the act 
happening, may not be enough to establish the specific intent of the person 
concerned. 
The most prominent situation of this kind arguably arises if the bench 
has to decide on the question whether genocide has been committed – a task 
in which both the ICJ6 and the international criminal tribunals7 have been 
engaged in the past. The actus reus of genocide, as stipulated in the Geno-
cide Convention8 and subsequent instruments of international law9 is com-
                                                        
4  For a prominent example, see ICTY (Appeals Chamber), Case No. IT-95-10-A, The 
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Judgment 5.7.2001 (Jelisić, Appeals Chamber), para. 71 and Zigi-
ranyirazo (Appeals Chamber), para. 73. 
5  ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 1994, IT/32/Rev. 44, (as amended) (ICTY 
RPE); ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 1995, (as amended) (ICTR RPE); ICC 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 (ICC RPE). For the ICJ, the “Rules 
of Court” (14.4.1978, as amended) apply (ICJ Rules). 
6  See Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (ICJ, Genocide Application Case), ICJ Reports 2007, 1 et seq. 
7  Cases involving charges of genocide arise more regularly before the ICTR than before 
the ICTY. However, important case law on the issue of genocide has been generated by the 
latter tribunal as well (see e.g. the aforementioned Jelisić Case (note 4); ICTY (Appeals 
Chamber), Case No. IT-98-33-A, The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Judgment 19.4.2004 
(Krstić, Appeals Chamber) and, more recently, ICTY (Trial Chamber), Case No. IT-05-88-T, 
The Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolić, Ljubomir Borovcanin, 
Radivoje Miletić, Milan Gvero, Vinko Pandurević, Judgment 10.6.2010 (Popović et al., Trial 
Chamber). 
8  Art. II Genocide Convention. 
9  Art. 4 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY Statute), Art. 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR Statute), 
Art. 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute). 
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parably easily fulfilled: causing “serious bodily or mental harm” to a mem-
ber of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, suffices.10 The mens rea 
on the other hand requires a mindset that goes far beyond that. In this re-
gard, the Genocide Convention specifies that the perpetrator must have had 
the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part” the protected group as such.11 It 
is primarily the difficulty of proving this form of intent which led the ICJ in 
the Genocide Application Case to reject the employment of the word 
“genocide” for any of the atrocities of the Bosnian war except the mass kill-
ings at Srebrenica in 1995.12 The international criminal tribunals have en-
countered similar problems relating to a positive finding of specific geno-
cidal intent.13 
The procedural rules of the international tribunals, where they exist, are 
only of limited help in this matter. The Rules of the Court which the ICJ 
adopted in 1978, are fairly laconic when it comes to the evaluation of evi-
dence14 and merely state that the “method of handling” evidence “shall be 
settled by the Court” (after ascertaining the views of the parties15). Impor-
tant issues such as the standard of proof which needs to be met, are not spe-
cifically addressed and have therefore become subject to some debate in the 
literature.16 Green, who examined several cases of “fluctuating standards” 
employed by the ICJ in the field of self-defense, noted that it “runs against 
the grain of international arbitral practice to attempt to identify evidentiary 
standards at all”;17 and it is certainly true that the court reserves the right to 
                                                        
10  In addition to this, the Elements of Crime (2000) stipulate for the first time a further 
contextual element: the conduct must have taken “place in the context of a manifest pattern of 
similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such de-
struction”. The legal validity of this element, however, is subject to some controversy: see the 
debate in ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, paras. 125-133, and R. Cryer, The Definitions of Interna-
tional Crimes in the Al Bashir Arrest Warrant Decision, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 7 (2009), 209. 
11  Art. II Genocide Convention. 
12  ICJ, Genocide Application Case, para. 370. 
13  ICTY (Trial Chamber), Case No. IT-95-10-T, The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Judg-
ment 14.12.1999 (Jelisić, Trial Chamber), paras. 106, 108; against that, Jelisić (Appeals Cham-
ber), para. 71. ICTY (Trial Chamber), The Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-
36-T, Judgment 1.9.2004, (Brdjanin, Trial Chamber), paras. 979, 982, 984, 987-989. 
14  On this, see J. R. Crook, Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice, AJIL 98 
(2004), 311. 
15  ICJ Rules, Rule 58. 
16  J. A. Green, Fluctuating Standards for Self-Defence in the International Court of Jus-
tice, ICLQ 58 (2009), 163 et seq.; M. E. O’Connell, Rules of Evidence for the Use of Force in 
International Law’s New Era, ASIL Proc. 100 (2006), 44. 
17  J. A. Green (note 16), 178. 
http://www.zaoerv.de/
© 2011, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
 Assessment of Int’l Criminal Evidence: The Case of the Unpredictable Génocidaire 665 
ZaöRV 71 (2011) 
adopt varying standards of proof, depending on the nature of the case.18 
However, as far as the determination of responsibility under the Genocide 
Convention is concerned, the ICJ itself demanded a fairly high standard: it 
considered it necessary to call for “proof at a high level of certainty appro-
priate to the seriousness of the allegation”.19 
In this regard, the RPE of the international criminal tribunals are more 
advanced: at least the required standard of proof is clear. The Court has to 
be satisfied that the guilt of the defendant has been proved “beyond reason-
able doubt”,20 a requirement which ultimately derives from the presump-
tion of innocence.21 The extensive case-law especially of the ICTY and the 
ICTR has furthermore offered further elaboration on questions of proce-
dure and evidence. It is for these reasons that the law of the international 
criminal tribunals provides a particularly interesting opportunity for an ex-
amination of the way in which evidence in relation to specific genocidal in-
tent is assessed. 
The procedural rules of the international criminal tribunals reveal influ-
ences by both common law and civil law traditions,22 and while it appears 
appropriate to speak of the sui generis character of the resulting regime,23 it 
is difficult to deny that it has adopted elements of the “inquisitorial” as well 
as the “adversarial” systems.24 The rules pertaining to the presentation of 
evidence have been viewed as more typical of the adversarial system,25 the 
existence of a bench trial (as opposed to a trial by jury) as more indicative of 
the inquisitorial system;26 the absence of an “investigating judge” as bearing 
a closer relation to the adversarial system,27 and so forth. 
                                                        
18  “The Court’s prime objective as to standard of proof appears to have been to retain a 
freedom in evaluating the evidence, relying on the facts and circumstances of each case”, R. 
Higgins, Speech to the 6th Committee of the General Assembly, 2.11.2007, 4, at http://www. 
icj-cij.org/presscom/files/3/14123.pdf. 
19  ICJ, Genocide Application Case, para. 210. 
20  Rule 87 (A) ICTY RPE; Rule 87 (A) ICTR RPE; Art. 66 of the ICC RPE. 
21  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Art. 14: Right to equality before 
courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007). 
22  R. May/M. Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, 
The Hague, and Arusha, Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 37 (1999), 727. 
23  K. Ambos, International Criminal Procedure: “adversarial”, “inquisitorial” or mixed?, 
International Criminal Law Review 3 (2003), 34, with reference to Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., 
Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, Esad Landzo 1.5.1997 
(IT-96-21-T), para. 15. 
24  For a critical evaluation of the use of these terms, see K. Ambos (note 23), 2 et seq. 
25  R. May/M. Wierda (note 22), 727. 
26  But see P. L. Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, EJIL 11 (2000), 575. 
27  P. L. Robinson (note 26). 
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These differing traditions not only had an impact on the RPE; they also 
help to explain certain procedural mechanisms which were only developed 
through the case-law of the international criminal tribunals. While the Trial 
and Appeals Chambers regularly dedicate extensive sections of their judg-
ments to evidentiary issues, it is true that some norms in this field are better 
developed than others. The question of admissibility is an example for the 
former. The rules of all three international criminal tribunals make reference 
to the admissibility of evidence;28 in the case of the ad hoc tribunals they 
stipulate that “relevant” evidence which the Chamber deems to have “pro-
bative value” may be admitted.29 In practice, however, the decision will of-
ten be in favor of admissibility,30 leaving the potential dismissal of pieces of 
evidence to the stage of assessment. The Tribunals themselves are often en-
gaged with the evaluation of the reliability of particular forms of evidence 
(documents and witness evidence).31 
However, neither the admissibility nor the reliability of evidence on their 
own are capable of lending sufficient assistance to the evaluation of evi-
dence, especially if the case involves the determination of specific intent, 
where judges often have to gauge the subjective element from more circum-
stantial factual evidence. It is entirely possible that the available evidence is 
admissible, reliable and relevant, but does not yield sufficient clarity about 
the mindset of the perpetrator.  
For instance, a defendant charged with genocide may indeed have caused 
the death of members of the protected group, but may have assisted others 
or let them escape.32 A suspected génocidaire may have targeted a substan-
                                                        
28  Rule 89 (C) ICTY RPE; Rule 89 (C) ICTR RPE; Rule 63 ICC RPE. 
29  Rule 89 (C) ICTY RPE; Rule 89 (C) ICTR RPE. Rule 63 of the ICC states that the 
Chamber has the authority to “assess freely all evidence” to determine “its relevance or ad-
missibility”. On this principle of “free assessment of evidence”, see at note 35. 
30  R. Cryer/H. Friman/D. Robinson/E. Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International 
Criminal Law and Procedure, 2010, 466, and see Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Decision Adopt-
ing Guidelines on the Standards Governing the Admission of Evidence, Decision of 
19.1.2006, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Annex A, Guidelines on the Standards Governing the Ad-
mission of Evidence, para. 2. (with reference to documentary evidence). 
31  See e.g., ICTY (Trial Chamber), Case No. IT-00-39-T, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, 
Judgment 27.9.2006, (Krajišnik, Trial Chamber) paras. 901, 902; ICTR (Trial Chamber), Case 
No. ICTR-96-4-T, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment 2.9.1998 (Akayesu, Trial 
Chamber), para. 131. 
32  See for instance Jelisić (Trial Chamber), para. 106; ICTR (Appeals Chamber), Case No. 
ICTR-95-1-A, The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Judgment 
1.6.2001, (Kayishema, Appeals Chamber), para. 147; ICTR (Trial Chamber), Case No. ICTR-
95-1-T, The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Judgment 21.5.1999 
(Kayishema, Trial Chamber), para. 310; ICTR (Trial Chamber), Case No. ICTR-01-74-T, The 
Prosecutor v. François Karera, Judgment 7.12.2007 (Karera, Trial Chamber), para. 582. 
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tial part of a protected group, but may claim to have acted for reasons other 
than the intended destruction of the group as such.33 In these cases, several 
strands of evidence exist which are all relevant to the question of the subjec-
tive element, but which, if they are accepted as equally reliable, constitute 
an apparent contradiction. 
The challenge for the judges then relates not so much to admissibility or 
credibility, but to the weighing of the available evidence.34 That task, how-
ever, falls into those areas of procedural law where the rules of the tribunals 
do not show an advanced degree of development. This is quite deliberate: 
the guiding principle on the weighing of evidence is the freedom of assess-
ment. It is a principle which the international criminal tribunals have con-
firmed on several occasions,35 and whose existence reveals a certain influ-
ence of the inquisitorial system: freedom of assessment forms a traditional 
element of the domestic procedural law of civil law countries.36 The ration-
ale for this freedom is best understood through an appreciation of the dif-
ference between international criminal procedure and common law systems: 
the procedure before international criminal tribunals envisages a bench trial; 
                                                        
33  See for instance Kayishema (Appeals Chamber), para. 161. 
34  See also P. M. Hassan-Morlai, Evidence in International Criminal Tribunals: Lessons 
and Contributions from the Special Court for Sierra Leone, African Journal of Legal Studies 3 
(2009), 104. That the decision-making process in these situations involves a weighing of evi-
dence was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in the case of Goran Jelisić, when it did not 
dismiss the instances in which the defendant “showed mercy” as lacking credibility, but noted 
that “a reasonable trier of fact could have discounted” them as “aberrations”, Jelisić (Appeals 
Chamber), para. 71. See also the criticism made in ICTR (Trial Chamber), Case No. ICTR-
01-72-T, The Prosecutor v. Simon Bikindi, Judgment 2.12.2008 (Bikindi, Trial Chamber), para. 
248. 
35  See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Martić (Trial Chamber), Decision Adopting Guidelines 
on the Standards Governing the Admission of Evidence, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Decision of 
19.1.2006, Annex A, para. 2; ICTR (Trial Chamber), Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, The Prosecutor 
v. Alfred Musema, Judgment 27.1.2000 (Musema, Trial Chamber), para. 75; ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Milomir Stakić (Trial Chamber), Provisional Order on the Standards Governing the Ad-
mission of Evidence and Identification, Case No. IT-97-24-PT, Decision of 25.2.2002, Annex, 
para. 1; Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihasanovic, Amir Kubura (Trial Chamber), Decision on the 
Admissibility of Documents of the Defence for Enver Hadzihasanovic, Decision of 22.6.2005, 
Case No IT-01-47-T, para. 15. “Freedom of assessment” is a general principle that also refers 
to decisions on admissibility and relevance; in this context, the Rules of the ICC make express 
reference to it in Rule 63 (2). The ICTY and ICTR Rules merely require a Chamber to “apply 
rules of evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it” (Rule 89 
[B] ICTY RPE, Rule 89 [B] ICTR RPE). 
36  ICTY (Trial Chamber), The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 
4.5.1997, (Tadić, Trial Chamber), para. 537; ICTY (Appeals Chamber), Case No. IT-95-16-A, 
Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić, Mirjan Kupreškić, Vlatko Kupreškić, Drago Josipović, Vladi-
mir Šantić, Judgment 23.10.2001 (Kupreškić et al., Appeals Chamber), para. 38. For a refer-
ence to the German and French systems, see P. L. Robinson (note 26), 577. 
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and the argument can therefore be made that there is “no need to protect 
jurors from lay prejudice”.37 As professional judges, members of the Trial 
Chambers are considered to bring a sufficient amount of experience to their 
job when it comes to the weighing of evidence.38 
But the result of this is that there are no hard and fast rules to which the 
tribunals have to adhere when they engage in this task. From time to time, 
the Trial Chambers themselves have offered suggestions when it came to the 
evaluation of certain forms of evidence. Evidence which was corroborated 
by other evidence was seen as having greater value than evidence standing 
alone;39 there needs to be a sufficient link between the time to which the 
evidence refers and the relevant period under the terms of the indictment;40 
circumstantial evidence can be used, but if an inference is to be drawn from 
it, it must be the only reasonable conclusion available.41 While the reasoning 
behind these views may be attractive, it is not always clear if they have de-
veloped into normative rules of evidence in the procedural law of the inter-
national criminal tribunals. 
Not everybody considers this freedom of assessment a disadvantage. 
Cryer et al. point out that “complex factual situations, large amount of evi-
dence, and difficulties in obtaining it, are all reasons for flexibility”42 while 
admitting that this “also raises issues of fairness and efficiency of the pro-
ceedings”. The very complexity does indeed support arguments to the con-
trary: given the qualitatively and quantitatively challenging nature of the 
issues before them, the efficiency of the proceedings may benefit from the 
adoption of clear guidelines which judges can follow in all situations in 
which they apply. 
In fact, there are few limitations which are placed on the discretion of the 
Trial Chamber judges: the rules of ICTY and ICTR merely stipulate that 
the adopted rules of evidence have to be “consonant with the spirit of the 
Statute and the general principles of law”.43 Some restrictions can be identi-
fied from the jurisprudence of the Appeals Chambers, but they are quite 
general in nature: chief among them the fact that the Trial Chamber has to 
                                                        
37  R. Cryer/H. Friman/D. Robinson/E. Wilmshurst (note 30), 465. 
38  K. Ambos (note 23), 30 and see P. M. Hassan-Morlai (note 34), 112. 
39  Musema (Trial Chamber), para. 75. 
40  Kayishema (Appeals Chamber), para. 130. 
41  ICTY (Trial Chamber), Case No. IT-02-60-T, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dra-
gan Jokić, Judgment 17.1.2005 (Blagojević (Trial Chamber), para. 21. 
42  R. Cryer/H. Friman/D. Robinson/E. Wilmshurst (note 30), 465. 
43  Rule 89 (B) ICTY RPE; Rule 89 (B) ICTR RPE. 
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engage in some form of evaluation in the first place44 and is apparently not 
allowed to delegate this task to experts.45 The evaluation must not be unrea-
sonable or “wholly erroneous”,46 but the Appeals Chambers accept that 
two judges, “both acting reasonably” can reach different conclusions on the 
available evidence.47 The standard of proof, which has been mentioned 
above, acts as a further limitation on the freedom of assessment: a finding of 
guilty may only be entered if the prosecution has proved guilt beyond rea-
sonable doubt.48 
The enforcement of these limitations, however, carries its own difficul-
ties. The Appeals Chambers of the ad hoc tribunals certainly have the au-
thority to reconsider the decisions of the Trial Chambers, and they do so if 
they perceive errors of law which invalidate the decision49 or errors of fact 
which result in a “grossly unfair outcome in judicial proceedings”.50 The 
ICC Statute envisages appeals in cases of procedural errors as well as errors 
of fact or of law.51 The convicted person and the Prosecutor on his behalf 
may also make an appeal on any other ground affecting “the fairness or reli-
ability of the proceedings or decision”.52 As a general rule, however, the 
Appeals Chambers are reluctant to repeat the process of ascertaining the 
available evidence. The view expressed by the Aleksovski Appeals Chamber 
is generally followed: “Trial Chambers are best placed to hear, assess and 
weigh the evidence, including witness testimonies, presented at trial.”53 In 
this context, Appeals Chambers frequently refer to a “margin of deference” 
which has to be given to the Trial Chambers’ assessment of evidence pre-
                                                        
44  In the Krajišnik Case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber did not 
have to refer to every piece of evidence “as long as there is no indication that the Trial Cham-
ber completely disregarded any particular piece of evidence”, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), Case 
No. IT-00-39-A, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Judgment 17.3.2009 (Krajišnik, Appeals 
Chamber), para. 379. 
45  Contempt Proceedings against Dragan Jokić, Appeals Chamber (ICTY), Judgment on 
Allegations of Contempt, 25.6.2009, para. 18 and K. Margetts/P. Hayden, Current Develop-
ments at the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, Journal of International Criminal Jus-
tice 8 (2010), 672. 
46  ICTY (Appeals Chamber), Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, 
Judgment 24.3.2000 (Aleksovski, Appeals Chamber), para. 63. 
47  ICTY (Appeals Chamber), Case No. IT-94-1-A, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Judgment 
15.7.1999, (Tadić, Appeals Chamber), para. 64. 
48  See note 20 and P. M. Hassan-Morlai (note 34), 102. 
49  R. Cryer/H. Friman/D. Robinson/E. Wilmshurst (note 30), 472. 
50  Kupreškić et al. (Appeals Chamber), para. 29. 
51  Art. 81 (1) (a) ICC Statute. 
52  Art. 81 (1) (b) ICC Statute. 
53  Aleksovski (Appeals Chamber), para. 63. 
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sented at trial.54 In the Jelisić Case, the Appeals Chamber did show itself 
interventionist and reproached the Trial Chamber for the way in which it 
had performed its task of weighing the evidence.55 But this led to a split 
among the judges, with Judge Pocar writing in his partially dissenting opin-
ion that he felt the Appeals Chamber should not have “disturb[ed] the fac-
tual findings made by the Trial Chamber”56 and referring back to the estab-
lished margin of deference due to the Trial Chamber’s evaluation of evi-
dence.57 
The result of these developments is that the Trial Chambers of the inter-
national criminal tribunals are relatively unhindered in their methods of 
weighing the available evidence. This is a flexibility which may be perceived 
as advantageous, as Trial Chambers have to deal with a plethora of different 
situations which may require the employment of adaptable approaches. But 
this flexibility also creates the possibility that two different Trial Chambers, 
faced with comparable situations, come to different results in their weighing 
of evidence, which may both be perfectly valid. The consequence of this is 
an uncertainty which places considerable obstacles in the preparation of the 
cases of both prosecution and defense, since neither of them can ever be 
sure by what standards their evidence will be judged. For legal practitioners, 
the prevailing uncertainty hampers the development of an adequate trial 
strategy; for the defendant, it may spell the difference between an acquittal 
and a long prison term or even a life sentence. 
This article will deal with one area in particular in which uncoordinated 
methods of weighing evidence have played a significant role in international 
criminal procedure: the assessment of genocidal intent; specifically in those 
cases in which contradictory pieces of evidence exist. In these situations, the 
admissibility of evidence is not in question, and the differing strands may 
even carry comparable credibility. But as they point in different directions, 
the determination of their incriminatory value is left largely to the discre-
tion of the judges of the Trial Chamber. This article suggests that the result-
ing differences in outcome are unsatisfactory, and it seeks to advance op-
tions which would lead to better solutions of the prevailing difficulties. 
 
 
                                                        
54  ICTR (Appeals Chamber), Case No. ICTR-96-4, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 
Judgment, 1.6.2001 (Akayesu, Appeals Chamber), para. 132; Tadić (Appeals Chamber), para. 
64; Kupreškić et al. (Appeals Chamber), para. 30; Aleksovski (Appeals Chamber), para. 63. 
55  Jelisić (Appeals Chamber), para. 71, see note 34 above. 
56  Jelisić (Appeals Chamber), Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar, para. 7. 
57  Jelisić (note 56), fn. 3. 
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II. Inconsistent Behavior in Genocide Cases: The View of 
the International Criminal Tribunals 
 
It is the particular importance which genocidal intent exercises in relation 
to the entire concept of the crime, that turns it into a principal illustration 
for the results which the lack of uniformity in the assessment methods of 
the international criminal tribunals engenders. On the one hand, the intent 
of the génocidaire – the intent “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”58 – is one of the most significant 
elements of genocide; one which the International Law Commission em-
phasized as the crime’s “distinguishing characteristic”.59 On the other hand, 
intent is notoriously difficult to prove, and the acceptance of suitable ele-
ments of evidence has therefore become of crucial importance to the adjudi-
cation of the crime.60 
Not all situations pose the same problems. In the past, the international 
criminal tribunals have dealt with cases in which statements were made 
which left little doubt as to the intent of their authors (especially when fol-
lowed by unambiguous actions against the victim group). A prime example 
is the phrase tubatsembatsembe (“let’s exterminate them”) which was used 
during the massacres in Rwanda in 1994.61 But in many instances, such clear 
                                                        
58  Art. II Genocide Convention; Art. 4 (2) ICTY Statute; Art. 2 (2) ICTR Statute; Art. 6 
ICC Statute. 
59  Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1996, vol. 2, part 2, part 44, Art. 17 
(“Crime of Genocide”), para. 5. 
60  See M. Lippman, Genocide: The Crime of the Century. The Jurisprudence of Death at 
the Dawn of the New Millenium, Hous. J. Int’l L. 23 (2000-2001), 506. The ad hoc tribunals 
have looked to a variety of strands of evidence to establish genocidal intent. For a summary, 
see D. L. Nersessian, The Razor’s Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups Under the 
Genocide Convention, Cornell Int’l L. J. 36 (2003), 314 and L. Martinez, Prosecuting Terror-
ists at the International Criminal Court: Possibilities and Problems, Rutgers L. J. 34 (2002-
2003), 24 as well as the extensive discussion in D. Alonzo-Maizlish, In Whole or in Part: 
Group Rights, the Intent Element of Genocide, and the “Quantitative Criterion”, N. Y. U. L. 
Rev. 77 (2002), 1386 et seq.; and C. Fournet, International Crimes: Theories, Practice and Evo-
lution, 2006, 90. 
61  See in particular ICTR (Trial Chamber), Cases No. ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17-T, 
The Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana, Judgment 21.2.2003 (Ntakiruti-
mana, Trial Chamber), para. 359 and ICTR (Trial Chamber), Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, The 
Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, Judgment 
3.12.2003 (Nahimana et al., Trial Chamber), paras. 964 and 967. The defendant Barayagwiza 
did appeal the finding of the Trial Chamber, principally on the grounds that he had used diffe-
rent words. The Appeals Chamber dismissed this ground of his appeal. ICTR (Appeals 
Chamber), Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan 
Ngeze v. The Prosecutor, Judgment, 28.11.2007 (Nahimana et al., Appeals Chamber), paras. 
529, 539. 
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utterances are missing, and the Trial Chambers have to deduce the mindset 
of the perpetrator from other circumstances; in particular, the perpetrator’s 
general conduct at the time. It is in this context that one of the greatest chal-
lenges for the assessment and weighing of evidence arises: the difficulty 
raised by a perpetrator whose conduct allows for a variety of interpreta-
tions, because it lacks consistency. The fact, for instance, that the accused 
has helped members of the targeted group, demonstrates, in the eyes of the 
defense, that he could not have acted with the required intent. To the prose-
cution, selective assistance to group members will usually not detract from 
the general finding that the defendant had the intent to destroy the group as 
such. 
In other cases, a reference to inconsistent behavior has been employed to 
make a case for factors which should be considered in mitigation; the “holes 
in the pattern” are therefore employed for their potential impact on the 
level of sentencing rather than on the assessment of the substantive criminal 
law. 
The conclusions of the Trial Chambers and Appeals Chambers reflect the 
respective variations. From their judgments, three main strands can be dis-
tinguished: There are cases in which the question is considered whether in-
consistent behavior could count as exculpatory evidence. Secondly, there are 
cases in which inconsistent behavior is considered as a potentially mitigating 
factor. The third category is formed by cases in which the Chamber did not 
accord any weight to inconsistent behavior – usually, because it had doubts 
about the evidence which the defense presented. 
The Case of Jelisić is the most prominent example for the first category of 
cases. Jelisić, a former farm mechanic, had become a guard at the Luka 
prison camp in Northern Bosnia.62 His indictment encompassed 44 counts, 
of which 43 dealt with crimes against humanity and violation of the laws 
and customs of war.63 The first count was a charge of genocide, for the sys-
tematic killing of Bosnian Muslims, inter alia at the Luka Camp. The evi-
dence against him seemed overwhelming. Jelisić, a man who called himself 
the “Serbian Adolf” (and presented himself as “Adolf” at his initial hearing), 
had made in his time at the camp statements which appeared to cast little 
                                                        
62  The Seattle Times, 14.12.1999, Bosnian Serb Gets 40 Years for War Crimes, and Jelisić 
(Trial Chamber), para. 123. On Jelisić’s background, M. A. Drumbl/K. S. Gallant, Appeals in 
the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: Structure, Procedure and Recent Cases, The 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 3 (2001), 638 and K. D. Askin, Judgments Rendered 
in 1999 by the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 
ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 6 (1999-2000), 499. 
63  ICTY (Trial Chamber), Case No. IT-95-10-I, The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Amended 
Indictment, 19.10.1998 (Jelisić, Indictment). 
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doubt on his intentions: he “hated Muslim women […] wanted to sterilise 
them all in order to prevent an increase in the number of Muslims but […] 
before exterminating them he would begin with the men in order to prevent 
any proliferation”.64 He kept a tally of the Muslims he had killed.65 He 
claimed he had to execute “twenty to thirty persons before being able to 
drink his coffee each morning”.66 
But Jelisić also gave – “against all logic”, as the Tribunal observed – lais-
sez-passers to some detainees, including one Muslim who was first forced to 
play Russian roulette with him, and another detainee who had first been 
beaten by Jelisić.67 
What makes the Jelisić Case unusual is that the Trial Chamber accorded 
considerable weight to the existence of contradictory evidence. Having re-
ferred to the fact that Jelisić had let some detainees go free, it stated that 
Jelisić had killed arbitrarily rather “than with the clear intention to destroy a 
group”; and in view of this uncertainty, the Chamber found that  
 
“The benefit of the doubt must always go to the accused and, consequently, 
Goran Jelisic must be found not guilty on this count.”68 
 
There is a marked difference between this finding and the conclusions 
reached by the Appeals Chamber in the Case of Kayishema and Ruzindana. 
Clément Kayishema had been prefect of the Kibuye province at the time of 
the atrocities in Rwanda69 – by training, he was a medical doctor.70 The evi-
dence against Kayishema was again formed in part by incriminating utter-
ances. The defendant had referred to Tutsis as “Tutsi dogs” and “Tutsi sons 
of bitches” and had exhorted attackers to “get down to work” – which in 
this particular context was understood to mean to begin to kill Tutsis.71 
But in this case, too, the defense referred to holes in the pattern. At the 
Appeals stage, the defense maintained that the Trial Chamber had not prop-
erly taken into account that Kayishema had also rescued “72 Tutsi children, 
                                                        
64  Jelisić (Trial Chamber), para. 102. 
65  Jelisić (Trial Chamber), para. 103. 
66  Jelisić (Trial Chamber), para. 103. 
67  Jelisić (Trial Chamber), para. 106. 
68  Jelisić (Trial Chamber), para. 108. See also K. Kittichaisaree, The NATO Military Ac-
tion and the Potential Impact Of the International Criminal Court, Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 4 
(2000), 513. The Appeals Chamber expressed a very critical opinion on this finding (see note 
34 above). 
69  Africa News/Inter News (Tanzania), Rwanda; Profile of a Genocide Convict, 
21.5.1999. 
70  Kayishema (Trial Chamber), para. 7. 
71  Kayishema (Trial Chamber), para. 539. 
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who had survived the massacre at Home St. Jean Complex”72 and who were 
brought to Kibuye hospital (where Kayishema used to work).73 The defense 
was not successful on this ground; although it appears that the Appeals 
Chamber also indicated some doubt as to the veracity of the claims: 
 
“The Appeals Chamber observes that in light of the overall evidence, the fact 
that the 72 children may have been taken to the hospital pursuant to Kayishema’s 
instructions has little direct bearing on the question whether he possessed the 
requisite mens rea.”74 
 
On other occasions, international criminal tribunals did consider in-
stances of selective assistance as a relevant mitigating factor, but did not dis-
cuss it in their evaluation of genocidal intent. The Case of Georges Ruggiu, 
a Belgian journalist (the only European to be tried by the ICTR) falls in that 
category. Ruggiu stood accused of incitement to genocide in connection 
with his broadcasts for the Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines 
(RTLM).75 On 15.5.2000, Ruggiu pleaded guilty to the counts of the in-
dictment, having signed a plea agreement with the prosecution.76 Ruggiu 
admitted that there was a link between his broadcasts and the deaths of vic-
tims in Rwanda.77 A phrase similar to that used by Kayishema made its ap-
pearance here – the words “go to work”, which had been used in the broad-
casts. The Trial Chamber found that with “the passage of time, the expres-
sion came to mean ‘go kill the Tutsis and Hutu political opponents of the 
interim government’”.78 
Ruggiu had, however, also “personally assumed responsibility” for the 
hiding and transport of Tutsi children in his jeep to a mission, to keep them 
protected. It was alleged that the feeding of a group of farmers and refugees 
in Kigali, including Tutsis, was also carried out under his responsibility – 
and these points were not disputed by the prosecution.79 On this occasion, 
the ICTR Trial Chamber accepted selective assistance as a mitigating factor. 
The Karera Case on the other hand is an example for the third category 
of cases, in which the tribunal simply did not consider the presented evi-
dence credible. At the time of the massacres in Rwanda, François Karera 
                                                        
72  Kayishema (Appeals Chamber), para. 147. 
73  See on this Kayishema (Trial Chamber), para. 310. 
74  Kayishema (Appeals Chamber), para. 149. Emphasis by the Appeals Chamber. 
75  ICTR (Trial Chamber), Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, The Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, 
Judgment 1.6.2000, (Ruggiu, Trial Chamber), para. 44. 
76  Ruggiu (Trial Chamber), para. 10. 
77  Ruggiu (Trial Chamber), para. 45. 
78  Ruggiu (Trial Chamber), para. 44. 
79  Ruggiu (Trial Chamber), paras. 73 and 74. 
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was prefect of the Kigali-Rural prefecture.80 Before the ICTR, Karera stood 
accused of genocide (alternatively, complicity in genocide) according to Ar-
ticles 2 (3) (a) / 2 (3) (e) ICTR Statute.81 In support of the charge, the prose-
cution referred inter alia to a public order, issued by Karera in April 1994 to 
police, militia and local residents, to kill every Tutsi.82 But the indictment 
itself pointed out that Karera had “selectively spared” certain Tutsis and 
their homes.83 The defense claimed that Karera had saved Tutsi civilians;84 
and where the prosecution referred to meetings in which Karera incited 
members of the Hutu civilian population to target Tutsi civilians,85 the de-
fense spoke of “pacification meetings” in which Karera urged the popula-
tion to stop looting and killing and called on them to “understand each 
other and live harmoniously”.86 In May 1994, he allegedly declared that his 
mission was to pacify Kigali, and condemned the massacres.87 
In this case, the Trial Chamber was not prepared to accept the evidence 
relating to the alleged saving of Tutsis – it declared it not credible.88 It was 
somewhat less dismissive about the pacification meetings, although it found 
it “surprising that meetings chaired by military and civil defense leaders 
were aimed at contributing to reconciliation and pacification”89 and it con-
cluded that it was at any rate established that Karera had at certain meetings 
made statements “which explicitly or by implication encouraged looting or 
killing of Tutsis”.90 The Chamber found that Karera had possessed the rele-
vant genocidal intent91 and decided further that there were no “significant 
mitigating circumstances” in this case.92 
                                                        
80  Karera (Trial Chamber), para. 1. 
81  ICTR (Trial Chamber), Case No. ICTR-01-74-I, The Prosecutor v. François Karera, 
Amended Indictment, 19.12.2005 (Karera, Indictment), III. (Counts 1 and 2). 
82  Karera (Indictment), III., para. 8. 
83  Karera (Indictment), III., para. 7. 
84  Karera (Trial Chamber), para. 582. 
85  Karera (Trial Chamber), para. 378. 
86  Karera (Trial Chamber), paras. 393, 396, 397. 
87  Karera (Trial Chamber), para. 399. 
88  Karera (Trial Chamber), para. 582. 
89  Karera (Trial Chamber), para. 416. 
90  Karera (Trial Chamber), para. 417. 
91  Karera (Trial Chamber), paras. 538, 539. 
92  Karera (Trial Chamber), para. 582. Karera was sentenced to life imprisonment; Karera 
(Trial Chamber), paras. 569, 585. On 2.2.2009, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial 
Chamber had committed no errors as far as the evaluation of the pacification meetings and the 
alleged saving of Tutsis was concerned and upheld the sentence of life imprisonment. ICTR 
(Appeals Chamber), Case No. ICTR-01-74-A The Prosecutor v. François Karera, Judgment 
2.2.2009 (Karera, Appeals Chamber), paras. 286, 387-390 and 398. (The Appeals Chamber did 
allow other grounds for appeal). 
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It therefore appears that the ad hoc tribunals have adopted widely differ-
ing approaches when they were faced with the task of evaluating contradic-
tory evidence in the context of genocidal intent. This is partly based on the 
way in which the defense invited the court to consider these holes in the 
pattern of the defendant’s conduct (as exculpatory evidence or as a mitigat-
ing factor). But the differences in the way in which the Trial Chambers dealt 
with contradictory evidence – in particular in view of their role in the as-
sessment of specific intent – create a situation which allows for little legal 
certainty and provides inadequate guidance for future cases of this kind. 
In these circumstances, there is room for the thought that an analytical 
examination of these situations and the respective significance of seemingly 
contradictory strands of evidence might assist in the development of a 
method of assessment which takes into account the concerns voiced by 
judges and scholars dealing with this issue. A necessary preliminary to this, 
however, is the question whether a situation of contradictory evidence 
really does exist in all cases in which its existence has been alleged. 
 
 
III. Towards an Understanding of Contradictory Evidence 
 
1. Does Contradictory Evidence Exist? 
 
Not every situation in which prima facie evidence of genocidal intent is 
joined by other pieces of evidence, leads by necessity to a contradictory 
outcome. There are cases where an actus reus of genocide was based on a 
variety of reasons – a range of underlying motives which do not necessarily 
eliminate the determinative specific intent to destroy a group in whole or in 
part. 
The very consideration of motives was met with criticism in the jurispru-
dence of the tribunals. The Kayishema Appeals Chamber for instance noted 
that criminal intent “must not be confused with motive” – without, how-
ever, examining where, in the case of genocide, the dividing line is to be 
drawn.93 The problem with this view lies in the fact that by accepting a do-
                                                        
93  Kayishema (Appeals Chamber), para. 161. See also Jelisić (Appeals Chamber), para. 49. 
Similarly B. van Schaack, Darfur and the Rhetoric of Genocide, Whittier Law Review 26 
(2004-2005), 1128. In fact, the question whether “motive” forms part of the elements of the 
crime of genocide, has caused one of the “major controversies” in the debate of this crime; G. 
E. Bisharat, Sanctions as Genocide, Symposium: International Sanctions Against Iraq: Where 
are we after Ten Years?, Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 11 (fall 2001), 379, at 416. Alonzo-
Maizilish states that there was “great debate” during the drafting of the Genocide Convention 
on the question whether a “motive element” should be included; D. Alonzo-Maizlish (note 
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lus specialis the drafters of the Genocide Convention do call for the explora-
tion of reasons behind the objective genocidal acts, which go well beyond 
the simple volitional element that mirrors the actus reus. It is not enough 
that the perpetrator (for example) killed members of the group and wanted 
to do that; he must have possessed the intent to destroy the protected 
group, in whole or in part, as such. But if this is the case, then motives carry 
a certain significance. The existence of particular motives may demonstrate 
that the reason behind the actus reus was not the destruction of the group 
and that therefore the dolus specialis is negated; while the existence of other 
motives may not be harmful to a finding of specific genocidal intent.94 
With regard to the latter alternative, the Appeals Chamber had occasion 
to note that the existence of personal motives,95 economic benefits or politi-
cal advantages96 does not necessarily exclude the presence of genocidal in-
tent.97 The co-existence of these reasons is certainly in principle possible. 
The defense in the Case of Ruzindana for instance, who stood accused of 
genocide before the ICTR, had claimed that it was the “elimination of busi-
ness competitors” that had influenced his actions. It would be difficult to 
argue that it should be impossible for a perpetrator to appoint the destruc-
                                                                                                                                  
60), 1382, fn. 58. Greenawalt points out that the record of the Ad Hoc Committee of 
ECOSOC which considered the draft of the Genocide Convention, does not reveal any dis-
cussions on the meaning of “intent” or “motive”, A. K. A. Greenawalt, Rethinking Genocidal 
Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation, Columbia Law Journal 99 (1999), 
2275. See also D. L. Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence 
from the International Criminal Tribunals, Tex. Int’l L. J. 37 (2002), 267. Some authors refer 
to genocidal intent as a “purpose” (A. A. Haque, Group Violence and Group Vengeance: To-
wards a Retributivist Theory of International Criminal Law, Buffalo Criminal Law Review 9 
(2005-2006), 310, which adds to the approximation of “intent” and “motive”. For a detailed 
discussion of the reasons in favor and against an inclusion of motives in the consideration of 
elements of a crime (with reference to English criminal law), see J. Herring, Criminal Law, 
2006, 213 et seq. and (with reference to American law), W. R. LaFave, Criminal Law, 2003, 
256 et seq. 
94  See also van Schaack on the obscuring of “evidence for genocidal intent”, if alternative 
explanations for the behavior in question can be identified; B. van Schaack (note 93), 1128. 
See also A. K. A. Greenawalt (note 93), 2285 and D. L. Nersessian (note 60), 315 (on motives 
which can indeed be considered as evidence for genocidal intent). – It is interesting to note 
that the international criminal tribunals were able to accept the significance of motives in the 
context of the subjective element of the perpetrator relating to the policy element of crimes 
against humanity. There, it was found that the perpetrator must not have acted “for purely 
personal motives completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian population”. Tadić (Trial 
Chamber), paras. 658, 659. 
95  Kayishema (Appeals Chamber), para. 161. 
96  Jelisić (Appeals Chamber), para. 49. See also D. L. Nersessian (note 93), 268 (on acts 
motivated by “financial gain” and ideological motives) and D. L. Nersessian (note 60), 315. 
97  See also G. Mettraux, Current Developments, International Criminal Law Review 1 
(2001), 279 and A. K. A. Greenawalt (note 93), 2288 (on “ideological or political motives”). 
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tion of a protected group as his goal while at the same time intending to 
gain economic benefits from this action. 
However, there is reason to believe that every case will need to be exam-
ined on its individual merits. In the case of Ruggiu for instance, the Belgian 
journalist had at some stage drawn the attention of the Gikondo population 
to the fact that members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) were in the 
area; a statement which resulted in the killing of many people, women and 
children among them.98 It seems, however, that Ruggiu had acted to warn 
one person in particular – the editor-in-chief of RTLM, who lived in this 
area. In a case like this it is at least conceivable that personal concerns rather 
than the desire to destroy a protected group had formed the intent of the 
perpetrator; additional evidence would be required to reach an appropriate 
assessment of this instance. 
Two situations in particular, in which assumed genocidal intent may have 
been joined by another consideration, have proven to be cumbersome for 
the international tribunals. 
The first concerns the potential co-existence of considerations of military 
or security concerns and genocidal intent. The Case of Ruggiu may again 
serve as an illustration of the complexities of this situation. The language 
used in Ruggiu’s broadcasts was frequently of a military nature: There was a 
move to encourage “civil defence”,99 there were references to the “enemy”, 
the RPF and their allies.100 It is significant that the Trial Chamber states 
that, as time went past, the exhortations to fight the RPF and their allies as-
sumed the meaning of exhortations to kill Tutsis and oppositional Hutus.101 
The relationship between the perception of military advantages and the in-
tent to destroy a protected group may therefore be very close. The situation 
is in so far similar to the assessment of a co-existence of economic or politi-
cal benefits: it is not inconceivable that a perpetrator might desire the de-
struction of a group and see in this at the same time a military advantage. 
It should, however, also be noted that there were cases in which the in-
ternational tribunals were content to accord greater weight to the military 
intention and to even allow it to exclude genocidal intent. Thus, the Trial 
Chamber in Brdjanin agreed that the fact that the greater part of the detain-
ees in camps had been of military age, 
 
“could militate further against the conclusion that the existence of genocidal 
intent is the only reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence. 
                                                        
 98  Ruggiu (Trial Chamber), para. 44 (viii). 
 99  Ruggiu (Trial Chamber), para. 44 (iv). 
100  Ruggiu (Trial Chamber), para. 44 (i). 
101  Ruggiu (Trial Chamber), para. 44 (iv). 
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There is an alternative explanation for the infliction of these acts on military-aged 
men, and that is that the goal was rather to eliminate any perceived threat to the 
implementation of the Strategic Plan in the ARK [Autonomous Region of Kra-
jina] and beyond.”102 
 
Whereas the Appeals Chamber in Krstić pointed out that the male Mus-
lim prisoners who had been killed, had been killed on the basis of their 
identity only; the victims had included civilians, old and young men.103 The 
evaluation of the co-existence of military and genocidal intent therefore be-
comes a question of case-by-case analysis. If it can be proven that the perpe-
trator directed his acts solely against those members of the protected group 
who posed a military threat, and left other parts of the group unharmed, the 
finding for a specific genocidal intent will be much more difficult to sup-
port.104 
Perhaps the most complicated case of a co-existence of intentions is that 
of the ethnic cleanser. The international tribunals – in particular the ICTY – 
have struggled long to evaluate the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing in the 
context of genocide. The Appeals Chamber in Krstić adopted the view that 
the forcible transfer of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica eliminated “even 
the residual possibility that the Muslim community in the area could recon-
stitute itself”.105 The Trial Chamber in Brdjanin spelled it out: “forcible dis-
placement”, in its view, “could be an additional means to ensure the physi-
cal destruction”.106 In the case of Blagojević, Trial Chamber I of the ICTY 
accepted that “intent to destroy” means the physical or biological destruc-
tion of the group, but it also found that physical or biological destruction 
was the likely outcome of a forcible transfer if the group could no longer 
reconstitute itself.107 
Not everybody agrees with this assessment. The Trial Chamber in Stakić 
saw a clear difference between the “mere dissolution” of a group and physi-
cal destruction.108 In this context, it went back to the travaux préparatoires 
                                                        
102  Brdjanin (Trial Chamber), para. 979. 
103  Krstić (Appeals Chamber), para. 37. 
104  It should be noted that the assertion that the perpetrator acted to avert a military 
threat, causes further complications. One may ask if child soldiers and human shields may be 
embraced by the definition of a “military threat”. If that were the case, then the difference 
between “military considerations” and the intention to destroy a protected group may be 
considerably diminished. 
105  Krstić (Appeals Chamber), para. 31. 
106  Brdjanin (Trial Chamber), para. 976. 
107  ICTY (Trial Chamber), Case No. IT-02-60-T, The Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and 
Dragan Jokić, Judgment 17.1.2005, (Blagojević, Trial Chamber), para. 666. 
108  ICTY (Trial Chamber), Case No. IT-97-24-T, The Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, 
Judgment 31.7.2003, (Stakić, Trial Chamber), para. 519. 
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and pointed out that a proposal to include “measures intended to oblige 
members of a group to abandon their homes […]” had been rejected by the 
drafters of the Genocide Convention.109 In the 2007 Genocide Application 
Case, the ICJ was similarly critical and found that  
 
“[n]either the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area ‘ethnically homo-
geneous’, nor the operations that may be carried out to implement such policy, 
can as such be designated as genocide: the intent that characterizes genocide is ‘to 
destroy, in whole or in part’ a particular group, and deportation or displacement 
of the members of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily equivalent 
to destruction of that group, nor is such destruction an automatic consequence of 
the displacement.”110 
 
Nor could it be said that academic opinion unequivocally supports a view 
of genocidal intent which encompasses the intent of the ethnic cleanser. 
Schabas went so far as to say that “[Ethnic cleansing] is intended to displace 
a population, [genocide] to destroy it. The issue is one of intent and it is 
logically inconceivable that the two agendas coexist.”111 
A coexistence of motives in this regard is not entirely “inconceivable”. If 
the perpetrator expels a protected group into a territory where certain death 
awaits its members – a desert for instance, or another region unfit for hu-
man existence – then it would appear entirely possible that genocidal intent 
and the intent of “ethnic cleansing” share a place in the mind of the author 
of the act.112 One example was provided in the Prosecutor’s appeal against 
the decision of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber not to include genocide in the 
arrest warrant against the Sudanese President Bashir. On this occasion, the 
Prosecutor pointed out that “the harshness of the terrain in Darfur, to 
which the victims were forcibly displaced”, had not been considered by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber.113 In the majority of cases, however, the assessment of 
the Trial Chamber in Stakić appears more convincing. Including ethnic 
cleansing in the definition of “physical or biological destruction” puts a 
                                                        
109  Stakić (Trial Chamber), para. 519. 
110  ICJ, Genocide Application Case, para. 190. 
111  This statement, which was made in W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The 
Crime of Crimes, 2000, 200, has become a locus classicus on this issue and was quoted in 
Brdjanin (Trial Chamber), fn. 2456. In the second edition of Schabas’ work (2009), it appears 
on 234. 
112  The ICJ did accept that acts of ethnic cleansing “may be significant as indicative of the 
presence of a specific intent (dolus specialis) inspiring those acts”. ICJ, Genocide Application 
Case, para. 109. 
113  Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the “Decision on the Prosecution’s Ap-
plication for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, ICC-02/05-01/09, 
10.3.2009, para. 27. 
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considerable linguistic strain on the phrase in question. “Destruction” car-
ries a distinct notion of permanence which does not inhabit the concept of 
“expulsion”: the group still exists, and it cannot even be said with certainty 
that it will never again re-form on its accustomed territory. 
 
 
2. Does Contradictory Evidence Exist at the Same Time? 
 
If the apparent conflict between evidence in support of genocidal intent 
and evidence to the contrary cannot be resolved by the assumption of co-
existence of the two strands of evidence, then a real situation of contradic-
tory evidence may exist. This is, however, only the case if the two strands of 
evidence exist at the same time. 
The principle of simultaneity (or contemporaneity), which is well known 
to major legal systems in the world114 retains its validity in the realm of in-
ternational criminal law. It is mandatory that the mens rea extends to the 
period in which the actus reus is performed. In other words, if a perpetrator 
kills a victim because he bore a personal grudge against him, and later de-
velops a general desire to destroy the entire group to which the victim be-
longs, it would be inapposite to apply this desire to the act in question; it 
comes too late. On the other hand, if a perpetrator once intended to destroy 
a protected group in whole or in part, repents his views, and then kills a 
member of the group for personal reasons, his views before the performance 
of the actus reus will not matter; they no longer exist at the crucial time. 
At first glance, such changes in the mindset of a suspected génocidaire 
might not seem a likely occurrence. But the “intent to destroy” which the 
Genocide Convention requires, need not be the same as a long-standing, 
unshakeable conviction. The commander of a concentration camp might 
have the intent to destroy the ethnic population of the camp and yet change 
his views very quickly after learning of an advancing military force whose 
objective is the liberation of the camp. His intent might be replaced by the 
opportunistic desire to show that he was also responsible for some positive 
acts towards the inmates of the camp. 
                                                        
114  For a discussion of the principle of contemporaneity in various domestic jurisdictions 
see A. R. White, The Identity and Time of the Actus Reus, Criminal Law Review (1977), 148; 
G. Marston, Note, Contemporaneity of Act and Intention in Crimes, L.Q.R. 86 (1970), 208; 
G. R. Sullivan, Cause and Contemporaneity of Actus Reus and Mens Rea, C.L.J. 52 (1993), 
487 et seq.; C. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil. Bd. 1, Grundlagen. Der Aufbau der Verbre-
chenslehre, 2006, 478 et seq.; A. Schönke/H. Schröder/P. Cramer, Strafgesetzbuch. Kommen-
tar, 2006, 269, paras. 48-49; H.-H. Jescheck/T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts. Allgemei-
ner Teil, 1996, 294. 
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The findings of both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber in re-
lation to François Karera’s “pacification meetings” indicates that the ICTR 
is (on occasion) careful to distinguish between different stages in the defen-
dant’s behavior. In reviewing the reasoning of the Trial Chamber, the Ap-
peals Chamber stated: 
 
“It is implicit from the Trial Judgement that the Trial Chamber considered the 
fact that the Appellant held these “so-called pacification meetings” was not irrec-
oncilable with the fact that he participated in other meetings in Rushashi”115 
 
and found that Karera had not made the case that attendance at the paci-
fication meetings “is incompatible with evidence that he was involved in the 
killings in Rushashi and Nyamirambo”.116 
As far as specific intent is concerned, a clear division of this kind does, 
however, necessitate sufficiently precise evidence for the existing intent of 
the perpetrator at the time of the actus reus. This appears easy enough when 
the author of the act accompanied the material part of the crime with utter-
ances which revealed his intention. But it is a fair assumption that in the ma-
jority of cases the best evidence that is available leads only to an approxima-
tion of the intent as it existed at the time of the act. 
In Jelisić’s Case for instance, it would be reasonable to see his boasts on 
the number of Muslim victims he had killed in the context of his most re-
cent victims, even though the utterances were apparently made after the 
act.117 But there are cases in which no such statements existed – neither a 
confession by the perpetrator before the tribunal, nor any other piece of 
evidence that could be convincingly linked to a particular act at a particular 
time. Instead, a number of evidential strains may exist, referring to roughly 
the same, more general, timeframe. In situations of this kind, the phenome-
non of contradictory evidence may indeed emerge; and it is then of impor-
tance to accord a value to the various forms of evidence that an international 
criminal tribunal may accept. 
 
 
IV. Towards an Assessment of Contradictory Evidence 
 
The jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunals provides a certain 
guidance as to the elements of human behavior which can appropriately be 
                                                        
115  Karera (Appeals Chamber), para. 284. 
116  Karera (Appeals Chamber), para. 286. 
117  Jelisić (Trial Chamber), para. 103. 
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considered in the determination of incriminating evidence.118 The tribunals 
are less clear about the evaluation of exculpatory evidence – evidence that 
negates the existence of genocidal intent. However, the principles of inter-
national criminal law are quite clear on situations which, after all due care 
has been taken to assess the significance of different strands of evidence, still 
present an insoluble evidentiary conflict pertaining to the mens rea of the 
suspected perpetrator: if reasonable doubt attaches to the existence of his 
intent, it must be resolved in favor of the defendant.119 
Among the elements of evidence accepted by the international tribunals, 
two seem to merit particular attention in this respect: the existence or oth-
erwise of an action and the existence or otherwise of a statement by the al-
leged genocidal perpetrator. 
The ad hoc tribunals have for a long time accepted that the acts of the de-
fendant themselves allow an inference of his intent at the time of commis-
sion.120 This position, however, may require qualification. If specific intent 
is indeed to be considered the “distinguishing characteristic” of genocide121 
and if it is this intent that distinguishes it from certain crimes against hu-
manity (extermination, murder), it would appear strange and contradictory 
to assume genocidal intent exclusively from the existence of, e.g. killings. 
The view expressed by some Trial Chambers, that the “scale of the atroci-
ties”122 and the “manner of killing”123 can allow an inference of genocidal 
intent is particularly unsatisfactory. Crimes against humanity can be com-
                                                        
118  For an overview of evidence accepted by the ad hoc tribunals in the case of genocide, 
see G. E. Bisharat (note 93), 414. See also N. H. B. Jørgensen, The Definition of Genocide: 
Joining the Dots In the Light of Recent Practice, International Criminal Law Review 1 (2001), 
297 (with references to the Report of the Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia and 
the 1985 Whitaker Report) 
119  See at note 20. See also Jelisić (Trial Chamber) para. 108 and Kayishema (Appeals 
Chamber), para. 148, “On the basis of such evidence, it found that it had been established 
beyond reasonable doubt that the requisite mens rea was present.” 
120  ICTR (Trial Chamber), Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, 
Judgment 15.5.2003, (Semanza, Trial Chamber), para. 313; earlier Akayesu (Trial Chamber), 
para. 523. 
121  See above at note 59 Also Jelisić (Trial Chamber), para. 66. 
122  “large number of victims”, ICTR (Trial Chamber), Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, The 
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki, Samuel Imanishimwe, Judgment 
25.2.2004 (Ntagerura et al., Trial Chamber), para. 689. See also L. J. LeBlanc, The Intent to 
Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention: The Proposed U.S. Understanding, AJIL 78 
(1984), 382; D. L. Nersessian (note 93), 266; D. L. Nersessian (note 60), 314 and G. Verdirame, 
The Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, ICLQ 49 (2000), 586. 
The “scale of the atrocities” was mentioned in Jelisić (Appeals Chamber), para. 47. For a criti-
cal assessment of these strands of evidence see Jørgensen (note 118), 298. 
123  The “manner in which the soldiers killed the refugees”, Ntagerura et al. (Trial Cham-
ber), para. 689. 
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mitted in an equally cruel fashion, and are indeed, because of the require-
ment of a “widespread and systematic attack”,124 likely to result in large 
scale atrocities. 
That does not mean that the facts of a case are without any value at all for 
the determination of the specific intent; but an assessment of intent which 
relies on only one of the above mentioned elements can easily yield mislead-
ing results. The opinion of the Akayesu Trial Chamber, which favored a 
more contextual view, is more convincing in this regard.125  
There is, however, one element on the material side of the crime which 
may carry greater weight in the assessment of genocidal intent than the oth-
ers. On some occasions, the defendant had adopted a process of selection 
before proceeding with the genocidal act. Thus, Semanza at one stage “in-
structed soldiers to separate Hutu from Tutsi, who were then killed by gun-
fire and grenades”.126 In the Bagambiki Case the Trial Chamber made refer-
ence to massacres committed on a football field; on the eve of the atrocities, 
soldiers had come to the field and had “asked the refugees whether they 
were all Tutsis”. 
If a perpetrator separates members of a protected group from other per-
sons, he certainly does engage in an act of discrimination. If he then pro-
ceeds to kill the members he had thus selected, he will, by this act, have cre-
ated a strong assumption that his action had indeed been based on an intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group as such. 
It may be more difficult to decide whether the lack of a particular action 
– in those cases where the perpetrator had the opportunity to act – can be 
taken as evidence for a lack of genocidal intent. 
This situation has not received uniform treatment by the Trial Chambers. 
In the Krstić Case for instance, the Appeals Chamber did not accept the 
possibility that the perpetrator could have done more to effect the destruc-
tion of the group, as an argument against the assumption of genocidal in-
tent. “Ineffectiveness” did not militate against the existence of specific in-
tent.127 In the Case of Stakić on the other hand, the Trial Chamber adopted 
a more accepting approach towards exculpatory evidence of this kind. With 
regards to killings in the Prijedor area, the Chamber found: 
 
                                                        
124  Art. 7 ICC Statute. 
125  “The Chamber considers that it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a 
particular act charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts sys-
tematically directed against that same group”, Akayesu (Trial Chamber), para. 523. 
126  Semanza (Trial Chamber), para. 429. 
127  Krstić (Appeals Chamber), para. 32. 
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“Had the aim been to kill all Muslims, the structures were in place for this to 
be accomplished”128 
 
and it pointed out that, while 23,000 people had passed through the 
Trnopolje Camp, the killings in Prijedor were limited to about 3,000 per-
sons.129 
In a similar vein, the Trial Chamber in Brdjanin pointed to the fact that 
the Bosnian Serbs in the Autonomous Region of Krajina had the logistical 
resources to displace “tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats, […] resources which, had such been the intent, could have been 
employed in the destruction of all Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats of 
the ARK”.130 
Context is again of great importance if the accurate value of the omission 
of a fact is to be ascertained. The omission of the destruction of a group 
when the perpetrator had the means at his proposal to proceed, may serve as 
a prima facie negation of genocidal intent. However, the consideration of 
contextual factors may change the picture. Thus, the Appeals Chamber in 
Krstić pointed out that the international attention which the situation in 
Srebrenica had attracted, may well have prevented the perpetrators from 
adopting a more “efficient way” of implementing a genocidal plan.131 
Of more importance for the determination of genocidal intent is proba-
bly the second piece of evidence which is frequently invoked by the interna-
tional tribunals – the existence of utterances at the commission of the actus 
reus of genocide. The various statements by Jelisić, Kayishema and Ruggiu 
have been mentioned above.132 In the Case of Jelisić in particular, it is diffi-
cult to dismiss – as the Trial Chamber did – the importance of his utterances 
for the assessment of genocidal intent; one may assume that there could 
hardly be clearer evidence of such an intent than the phrase that the perpe-
trator hated all members of the group and wanted to kill them all.133 
The lack of utterances on the other hand, appears not to have been seen 
as greatly significant in the determination of genocidal intent.134 A contex-
                                                        
128  Emphasis added by the Trial Chamber. Stakić (Trial Chamber), para. 553. 
129  Stakić (Trial Chamber), para. 553. 
130  Brdjanin (Trial Chamber), para. 978. 
131  Krstić (Appeals Chamber), para. 32. 
132  See also M. A. Lyons, Hearing the Cry Without Answering the Call: Rape, Genocide 
and the Rwandan Tribunal, Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 28 (2001), 
at 119. 
133  “Goran Jelisić remarked to one witness that he hated the Muslims and wanted to kill 
them all”, Jelisić (Trial Chamber), para. 102. 
134  “The Defence also argues that the record contains no statements by members of the 
VRS Main Staff indicating that the killing of the Bosnian Muslim men was motivated by 
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tual view may again yield different results – in situations, where a statement 
had been expected of, but was denied by, the defendant (such as the refusal 
to take an oath on a genocidal leader), the omission of utterances might al-
low an insight into his mind and may cast doubt on the existence of geno-
cidal intent. 
Apart from these two elements of evidence, the international tribunals 
have in the past considered the existence of a genocidal plan,135 the existence 
of a pattern (a systematic targeting of members of a group),136 and the repe-
tition of particular acts137 as relevant for the assessment of the defendant’s 
intent. However, there is reason to approach these factors, like the scale of 
the atrocities mentioned above, with a measure of caution. The decisive fac-
tor has to be the personal involvement of the defendant. A consideration 
which focuses on a pattern, on repeated acts or on a plan that was agreed by 
other perpetrators, may also catch the opportunist murderer who exploits 
the existing context of genocidal acts to get rid of isolated personal enemies 
within the group, without ever making the group “as such” the target of his 
intention. 
Finally, there are strands of evidence which have been dismissed by the 
international tribunals in the past. The Trial Chamber in Jelisić had, among 
other considerations, relied on the “disturbed personality”, the “anti-social” 
and “narcissistic” elements of his character, which had led him to commit 
the crime.138 The Appeals Chamber rejected this line of reasoning and re-
ferred to the fact that no defense of insanity had been employed by Counsel 
for Jelisić.139 
It seems a preferable view. What must count in the assessment of criminal 
responsibility is whether the perpetrator is capable of forming intent. A dis-
turbed personality may allow a finding that this ability did not exist and 
that therefore criminal responsibility cannot be assumed. But once the Trial 
Chamber is convinced that the perpetrator is capable of forming intent, the 
remaining disorders in his personality cannot serve to negate the finding of 
the requisite mens rea. 
                                                                                                                                  
genocidal intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica. The absence of such state-
ments is not determinative.”, Krstić (Appeals Chamber), para. 34. 
135  Jelisić (Appeals Chamber), para. 48. 
136  Jelisić (Appeals Chamber), para. 47, “a pattern of purposeful action”, Kayishema (Trial 
Chamber), para. 93. 
137  Jelisić (Appeals Chamber), para. 47. 
138  Jelisić (Trial Chamber), para. 106. 
139  Jelisić (Appeals Chamber), para. 70. 
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The Appeals Chamber also rejected the argument that Jelisić had killed 
his victims at random,140 and the Chamber concluded that a 
 
“reasonable trier of fact could have discounted the few incidents where he 
showed mercy as aberrations in an otherwise relentless campaign against the pro-
tected group”.141 
 
This, however, requires further qualification. In view of the great signifi-
cance that the absence of genocidal acts can carry,142 it seems particularly 
unsatisfactory that the Appeals Chamber would permit a “discounting” of 
such an important element of evidence.143 The preferable question would be 
one about the underlying motive to which the “aberrations” seem to point. 
The motive, it will be found, was, in the case of Jelisić, far from altruistic. 
Giving laissez-passers to a victim whom Jelisić had at first beaten and to an-
other, who had been forced to engage in a game of Russian roulette, is 
hardly the ephemeral moment of kindness that seems to be suggested in the 
judgment of the Appeals Chamber. His motive seems more likely rooted in 
the fact that he had become master of life and death and in the enjoyment of 
an exercise of power, which was made possible only by the dehumanization 
of his victims. As such, his motive was entirely compatible with the specific 
intent required for the crime of genocide. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
From the above examination, it appears that the problem of specific in-
tent and the impact of inconsistencies in the behavior of the perpetrator is a 
problem of evidence as much as of material law. Its particular difficulty lies 
in the proper evaluation of evidentiary elements which may point to other, 
possibly contradictory motives behind the actus reus. To simply disregard 
this evidence or to state that motives are “irrelevant”144 is an unsatisfactory 
approach; more so, as (as the case of Stakić has shown) a particular motive 
(ethnic cleansing) may be held to deny the existence of genocidal intent. 
                                                        
140  Jelisić (Appeals Chamber), para. 71. See, on a discussion of the Appeals Chamber’s 
judgment in the Jelisić Case, C. Fournet (note 60), 87. Also K. Kittichaisaree (note 68), 513. 
141  Jelisić (Appeals Chamber), para. 70. 
142  See at note 127. 
143  See, however, the interpretation of the Appeals Chamber’s judgment in G. Mettraux 
(note 97), 282. 
144  Kayishema (Appeals Chamber), para. 161, Jelisić (Appeals Chamber), para. 49. But see 
for a different approach (regarding crimes against humanity), Tadić (Trial Chamber), paras. 
658, 659. 
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The preferable view is an approach which would allow a detailed exami-
nation of evidence both in support of and against the assumption of geno-
cidal intent. In some cases, it will be found that evidence for a different rea-
son behind the acts of the perpetrator (e.g. economic, political or military 
advantages) may in fact coexist with the specific intent required for geno-
cide. In other cases (as in the majority of cases of ethnic cleansing), the mo-
tive thus established militates against a finding of specific genocidal intent. 
Even if contradictory evidence has been found to exist, a strict applica-
tion of the principle of simultaneity may help to resolve the difficulty. A 
motive which denies genocidal intent, but arises at a point in time different 
from that of the genocidal act, is irrelevant and cannot enter into the consid-
eration of the dolus specialis. 
There are finally factors which may aid in the determination of genocidal 
intent or of the existence of a different motive. The existence and omission 
of facts, the existence and omission of statements, a plan or a pattern, repeti-
tive acts and the independence of the perpetrator’s decision, have been men-
tioned above. The value of other factors, however – the “disturbed person-
ality” of a perpetrator or the “randomness” of his actions, has not found 
favor with the Appeals Chamber. 
The treatment of these issues by the judges of the international criminal 
tribunals, however, does not merely represent a conflict between a Trial 
Chamber and the Appeals Chamber, in which the latter would lay down 
clear guidelines for the future assessment of genocidal intent. The prevailing 
situation, as has been seen above, is marked by continued differences in the 
weighing of evidence by various benches of ICTY and ICTR. To a degree, 
these difficulties can be understood by an appreciation of the particular na-
ture of genocidal intent: it is certainly one of the most complex issues with 
which the international criminal tribunals have been confronted, and one 
which has a way of escaping simplified solutions. But it is also true that the 
differences in the evaluation of inconsistent behavior arise from the absence 
of a coordinated approach in the Trial Chambers, which is in turn based on 
an almost holy fear to lay down any but the most general rules on the as-
sessment of evidence by the trial judges. 
It is then not surprising that the claims of “inconsistent behavior”, of “se-
lective assistance” and of “motives other than genocidal intent” belong to 
the weapons of choice in the armory of the defense. The general principle of 
the freedom of assessment allows for the possibility that the Trial Chamber 
in the instant case may be just as generous as the Trial Chamber in Jelisić 
when it comes to the evaluation of (seemingly) contradictory evidence – and 
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that the Appeals Chamber will affirm the “margin of deference”145 if the 
prosecution disagrees with the outcome. As long as freedom of assessment 
is valued higher than certainty of the law, this situation is not likely to 
change, and it will inevitably be at the root of comparable difficulties in 
genocide cases before the ICC. 
                                                        
145 See at note 54. 
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